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Abstract
This research analyses how the Indonesian news media represents issue of terrorism within
Indonesian context. An attempt by the news media institutions in representing reality incorpo-
rates technology to produce and to distribute texts; institution where technology is formed and
controlled to produce texts; and cultural forms relate to the structuring of media technology and
organization; how language and meaning are composed into codes. Further, news media institu-
tions must also consider political and cultural contexts of the event. Thus, controversial and
crucial issues like terrorist attack and international war on terror are represented in accordance
with internal policy of news media institutions and the consideration of cultural and political
contexts. Tempo weekly news magazine is the news media under study. The research finding
indicates that Tempo focused on the investigation process and the un-cover of terrorist network.
Both issues were constructed within strong political and cultural perspectives that become the
characteristic of Tempo as a news media that is critical and free from any pressures. Actuality,
in-depth reporting and accuracy represent Tempo’s strong and independent editorial policy.
Abstrak
Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis media berita yang merepresentasikan isu terorisme dalam
konteks Indonesia. Upaya lembaga media berita dalam menampilkan realitas melalui teknologi untuk
memproduksi dan mendistribusikan teks; keberadaan institusi di mana teknologi dibentuk dan
dikendalikan untuk menghasilkan teks; dan  bentuk budaya yang berhubungan dengan penataan media
teknologi dan organisasi, bagaimana bahasa dan makna yang tertuang dalam kode. Institusi media juga
harus mempertimbangkan konteks politik dan budaya. Dengan demikian, isu-isu kontroversial dan
penting seperti serangan teroris dan perang internasional melawan teror diwakili sesuai dengan kebijakan
internal  lembaga media berita dengan pertimbangan dari konteks budaya dan politik. Metode penelitian
ini menggunakan analisis framing dengan objek  penelitian berita Majalah mingguan Tempo. Temuan
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa liputan Tempo difokuskan pada proses penyelidikan jaringan teroris.
Kedua isu dibangun dalam perspektif politik dan budaya yang kuat yang menjadi ciri dari Tempo
sebagai media berita yang kritis dan bebas dari tekanan. Aktualitas, pelaporan mendalam, dan akurasi
mewakili kebijakan kuat dan mandiri dari editorial  media Tempo.
Key words: indonesian news media, terrorism, and islam
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Introduction
The representation of terrorism in Indone-
sian news media is very much influenced by the
rise of civil society in which citizens are given the
opportunity to express their interests, needs and
ideas, and to achieve their mutual goals in order to
consolidate a sense of collective destiny and a  ‘ci-
vil’ society. The condition has created opportuni-
ties for new political parties and social groups like
Muslim organisations to appear. It has also driven
the new idea of freedom of the press in Indonesia.
The press becomes more critical in reporting an
issue. News media policies also experience sig-
nificant changes. Under the New Order authori-
tarian press system, the government determined
media and editorial policies. They were required
to be congruent with government communication
policy. However, post New Order conditions
Meanwhile, and in a more libertarian press sys-
tem, the owners and professional editors are free
to determine their own policies in accordance with
a democratically formed regulatory regime. Gov-
ernment communication policy only regulates the
press in order to ensure they obey codes of ethics
and law. To this extent, controversial and highly
significant events like the recent terrorist   attacks
and the international ‘war on terror’ are managed
and represented according to the internal policies
of the news media organizations, rather than the
directives of government. The news media, how-
ever, still need to consider cultural, political and
industrial contexts that come from outside the news
media institutions.
This research analyses Tempo represen-
tation of terrorism. With libertarian and critical re-
porting style, Tempo has become a leading news
magazine in Indonesia. Even after the banning of
this magazine in 1994 by the New Order regime
for four years, Tempo was able to gain its reputa-
tion as the leading news magazine when made its
return in 1998. Therefore, to look at how it repre-
sents the news on terrorism in Indonesia is in-
teesting in terms of media-government and Islam-
terrorism relationships. The complexity of the
news representation was also analysed in relation
to the dynamic of political changes that occurred
in the era of ‘reform’ and industrial context that
may affect editorial policy.
Analytically, the study investigates how
the Indonesia news media represent the issue of
terrorism. The representation of terrorism in the
Indonesian news media is the result of a complex
construction process which incorporates cultural,
political economic and industrial factors. The video
disc that recorded the confession of the suicide
bombers who committed the 2005 Bali bombing
were broadcasted on global television networks.
As with many other terrorist attacks, the terrorist
strategy of promoting and communicating causes
is clearly illustrated in the broadcast. As Walter
Lacqueuer (1987, 1993) has noted, terrorism in
this sense is fundamentally a communication event.
The ways in which the media represent the issue,
then, plays a significant role in shaping how peo-
ple think about the issue (Chomsky, 2001, Lewis,
2005). At the same time, the news media has to
consider various factors in reporting the issue as
terrorism is a sensitive and potentially divisive is-
sue. It is then interesting to analyze how different
Indonesian news media represent issues of ter-
rorism within an Indonesian context.
Research Method
This research was conducted using textual
analysis. Textual analysis seek to get beneath the
surface meanings and examine more implicit so-
cial meanings. The textual analysis often view cul-
ture as a narrative or story-telling process in which
particular “texts” or “cultural artifacts” consciously
or unconsciously link themselves to larger stories
at play in the society. Textual analysis is principally
based on an understanding that text is constructed
out of certain contexts. These include the writer,
his or her position, the intended audience, claim of
the text, and the situation at the time the texts is
presented.
Research Result and Interpretation
Mainly, this research is comprised into two
sections. First section outlines the profile and edi-
torial policy of Tempo news magazine. The dis-
cussion of the profile of Tempo is pertinent to give
the historical background of the news media insti-
tution that had affected Tempo’s editorial policy
in representing news on terrorism. Further, the re-
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search outlines how the meaning of news repre-
sentation of issue of terrorism in Tempo news
magazine has been constructed.
Tempo: the Profile and Editorial Policy
The Profile
Tempo was first established in the form of
magazine in 1971 by some young journalists:
Goenawan Mohamad, Fikri Jufri, Bur Rasuanto,
Christianto Wibisono, Yusril Djalinus and Putu
Wijaya. Tempo’s vision was to become the guid-
ance in the process of enhancing people’s free-
dom of thought and expression and to build soci-
ety that appreciates smartness and difference of
opinion. Published in the New Order era, Tem-
po’s professional practice of journalism gained high
appreciation from its readers, but was disliked by
the regime due to its critical reporting style. Phone
calls and warning either from the state or military
agencies were common during this period. As edi-
tor-in-chief of Tempo, Bambang Harymurti, said,
“A staffer’s conviction to a story may often be
challenged, but never crushed. If a story deserves
to be told, it will be printed regardless of the
consequences”(Company profile of Tempo,
2006). It did not take long time for Tempo to be-
come a respective news weekly magazine.
Tempo’s critical and libertarian reportage,
however, had resulted in the banning of the maga-
zine twice during Suharto’s New Order (1982 and
1994). The first banning (nearly for two months)
was employed due to Tempo’s reportage on the
issue of unrest in the Golongan Karya campaign.
This magazine was considered to have spread
hatred among supporters of this Suharto’s politi-
cal vehicle. The second banning, as has been dis-
cussed in research 6, relates to the reportage of
the buying of 39 ex German warship for Indone-
sian Navy. Tempo had been considered to have
played between Financial Minister, Mar’ie Mu-
hammad against Minister of Research and Tech-
nology, Habibie. The last banning, along with the
banned of two other news media, had triggered
protests from the banned news media journalists
and employees, students as well as academicians.
Whilst lodging a lawsuit to the state court
against Minister of Information policy, some ex
Tempo journalists continued its journalistic work
via virtual world. Since 1996, Tempo’s news online
portal was launched for the first time through its
web address www.Tempointeraktif.com. This
strategy was brilliant in relation to struggle for the
freedom of the press as well as to continue Tem-
po’s vision to become the guidance for freedom
of expression. It was made possible as the gov-
ernment was not aware of the power of virtual
world and therefore gave less attention to this is-
sue (see Sen and Hill, 2000).
At the end of Suharto’s regime, the maga-
zine made its return on 6 October 1998 and gained
its popularity. In order to expand its readers and
go international, Tempo launched its Japanese
edition of Tempo interactive in July 2000 and Eng-
lish edition of Tempo magazine on 12 September
2000. To fulfil the need of its readers for daily news,
the editorial board of Tempo published Koran
Tempo (Tempo Newsresearch) on 21 April 2001
with its general objective to report news critically
and in the ‘liberal’ tradition, which informs the
western democratic Fourth Estate model. As part
of its commitment to become an independent news
media institution, PT Tempo Inti Media tbk., which
publishes the magazine, allows its employees and
public to own the company’s share so that no par-
ties are dominant and may endanger Tempo’s edi-
torial policies.
First published in 1971 with 20,000 cop-
ies, Tempo’s circulation has now reached 300,000
copies, which is quite high for Indonesian media
industry. In relation to this issue, Tempo’s senior
editor, Goenawan Mohammad, gave his com-
ment:
There was no miracle responsible for our cur-
rent readership numbers. Today Tempo is the
most read publication of its kind. Tempo’s
story of survival and success has something
to do with its constant efforts to be highly re-
liable, both as a news organization and a busi-
ness enterprise.
Most of Tempo’s readers come from higher
educational background. It is well known among
its readers and society to be one of credible news
sources.
Since made its return on 29 September
1998, Tempo’s name cannot be separated from
weekly news magazine that is independent and
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presents news with professional journalistic
standard. Supported with three decades of expe-
rience, Tempo always becomes a leader in its field.
Actuality, in-depth and accuracy in reporting will
always become Tempo’s characteristic.
 Editorial Policy
Tempo news magazine employed editorial
policy where it refused any interference from any
parties. Its critical and libertarian reportage have
become strong characteristics of this magazine. Its
form as a magazine has made it possible for Tempo
to employ in-depth reporting style. The editorial
board of Tempo realized that in term of timeliness,
magazine was less fast than newsresearch that
daily published; and adopting in-depth reporting
was a way to deal with this situation.
To adjust with the news magazine format,
Tempo adopts feature writing style with the com-
bination of soft news and feature stories writing.
This writing style has become a characteristic of
Tempo with the purpose to reach wider audience
and to involve them with the stories they read. Mary
Gillepsie, feature writer of Chicago Sun-Times,
said,
News writers love the rush they get when they
run out and cover a breaking news story.
Meanwhile a feature involves readers on the
level of “This could happen to you”. You are
teaching people something about themselves
(in Itule & Anderson 2003:124).
As the consequence of the adoption of this
writing technique and in an attempt to influence
public, Tempo frequently uses figurative language
(symbolism, metaphor) and three forms of per-
suasion: ethos (credibility), pathos (emotion) and
logos (argument).
Tempo has a principle that public will only
trust the media if it acts accordingly and responsi-
bly, which are simply to be professional. Within
the context of recent terrorist attacks, Tempo prin-
cipally adopted fair, check and balance, and cover
both sides’ principles. For instance, as further dis-
cussed in the next section, it appeared in the form
of the reportage of Pesantren Al-Islam, Ngruki.
Despite high coverage of the accusation of the
radical teachings of this pesantren and the relation
of some of its alumni with some terrorism events
as reported by western news media, Tempo pro-
fessionally stayed neutral from the debate.
Bambang Harymurti, editor-in-chief of Tempo
commented, “Tempo is also known in the industry
for its ability to harness the creative energies of
its staff within an environment of mutual respect,
professionalism, and journalistic independence.”
Within Tempo’s perspective, public deserves the
right to interpret the news freely. As Stuart Allan
says, “Journalism is charged with the crucial mis-
sion of ensuring that members of the public are
able to draw upon a diverse ‘market place of
ideas’ to both sustain and challenge their sense of
the world around them” (2000:49).
The same policy was also employed by
Tempo in reporting how the government managed
terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Despite a long his-
tory where the magazine was ever banned twice
by the government, Tempo attempted to stay neu-
tral in reporting this issue. If it thought that the gov-
ernment had done nothing or tended to be slow to
overcome the issue, it would criticize the govern-
ment. On the other hand, Tempo gave credit to
government or security authority when it was able
to capture the suspected perpetrators. This was
evident in the case of the capture of Imam
Samudra, one of the 2002 Bali bombing perpe-
trators. In its No. 39/XXXI/25 Nov-1 Dec 2002
edition, Tempo used most of police news sources
to describe the arresting process of Imam Samudra
and in the end gave compliment to the police, al-
though at the same time remained it not to easily
satisfy.
Tempo was aware of its position as the
leading news magazine in Indonesia which placed
it at the centre of public life. To Tempo news maga-
zine, it was its responsibility for giving expression
to a richly pluralistic spectrum of information
sources that helped constructing the context for
the public  to make judgement of the terrorism
events. Thus, there was no need for the media to
take aside except to the interest of the public. This
principle is in accordance with Tempo’s vision to
be ‘a guide in the process of enhancing society’s
freedom to think and to express their opinion as
well as developing society that appreciates intelli-
gence and opinion difference’.
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Within the above understanding, certain
issues like the relationship between Islam and ter-
rorism in Indonesia and how the Indonesian gov-
ernment dealt with terrorism had become big con-
cern to Tempo. The analysis of Tempo’s repre-
sentation of terrorism is examined in detail in the
next section. It is focused on how the meaning of
issue of terrorism is presented and constructed in
Tempo news magazine. Further, it is examined
within cultural, political, and industrial contexts.
Tempo Representation of Terrorism
Terrorism has always been an issue with
high news value to news media institution. In In-
donesia, this issue increases as the perpetrators of
terrorism have used religion to legitimize their acts
of terror. As Hoffman said,
The combination of religion and terrorism can
be cited as one of the main reasons for ter-
rorism’s increased lethality. The fact that for
the religious terrorist violence inevitably as-
sumes a transcendent purpose and therefore
becomes a sacramental or divine duty, argu-
ably results in a significant loosening of the
constraints on the commission of mass mur-
der (1995:280).
With terrorism events such as the 2002 Bali
bombing, the 2003 JW Marriott hotel and the 2004
Australian Embassy bombings in Indonesia, which
have claimed hundreds of lives, have been associ-
ated with Islam in the country, and have damaged
the Indonesian reputation in the international
world, it is unlikely that the news media would ig-
nore the issue. Nonetheless, how the news media
institutions represent the issue is interesting to ana-
lyse.
The representation of the three terrorism
events in Tempo news magazine is interesting in
relation to the cultural, political as well as indus-
trial contexts. Tempo has a long history as a lead-
ing news magazine that reports news critically
and in the ‘liberal’ tradition, which informs the
western democratic Fourth Estate model. Its re-
lation with government, especially in the New Or-
der era, with two banning, proofs how this news
magazine will report the news that are considered
important to public regardless of the consequences.
And terrorism is one among other issues that are
considered important for the public to know. Thus,
Tempo felt it was necessary to report the issue as
part of its responsibility to public.
Tempo is widely known with its in-depth
reporting style. In the case of the 2002 Bali bomb-
ing for instance, more than tens of Tempo’s news
magazine editions were dedicated to report the
development of terrorism in Indonesia that had
been associated with Islam. Meanwhile, more than
tens of journalists were involved in the data and
news gathering to give solid, actual and reliable
information to public.
Principally, Tempo tended to represent the
issue through cultural and political perspectives.
Based on these perspectives, it gave special at-
tention to the following issues: (i) the investigation
process conducted by the police, and (ii) disclo-
sure of the terrorist network. This is signified by
the intense reporting of all the issues above. In
particular, Tempo gave high attention to the third
issue. Why did Tempo focus on these two issues?
Tempo felt it was necessary to seriously
report the issue of terrorism based on some argu-
ments. First, after the 9/11 attack toward the
United States, there has been global mispercep-
tion where Islam has been identified as a religion
that teaches violence. Something, according to
Tempo, needs to be clarified. Secondly, Tempo
felt it was its obligation to do news investigation in
order to find the ‘truth’ about how there were radi-
cal groups that justified their acts of terror in the
name of Islam. This issue had become special at-
tention to Tempo as part of its social control in
representing news on the teachings of Islam so that
there wouldn’t be any disputes within society, con-
sidering the fact that Muslims are dominant within
the country. The analyses of the representations
of the issues above are divided into sub headings
to make it easier to understand.
The Investigation Process Conducted by the
Police
The first issue that relates to political per-
spective is how the police conducted the investi-
gation process. The representation of this issue had
been a big concern to Tempo as terrorist attacks
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nearly occurred every year since the year 2000.
In each reporting of the three events, there were
always several news features that specifically dealt
with the issue, or the investigation process always
included in one among other issues in the main
news features. Nonetheless, unlike the Jakarta
Post daily in which issued editorials that princi-
pally blamed intelligence for not acting as an early
warning system; Tempo tried to be fair in report-
ing the issue. Tempo gave credit to the police if it
had been able to identify and capture the perpe-
trators of the acts of terror, but criticised it when
failed to do so. This is interesting considering the
fact that Tempo had been banned twice and re-
ceived several warnings from the government. This
can be proof of professional and reliable journal-
istic practice as Goenawan Muhhamd said in his
interview.
Besides reporting the investigation proc-
ess, Tempo also gave attention to issues of con-
flict between police and military, and lack of co-
ordination among intelligence agencies. Through
these representations, Tempo intended to warn
government and related agencies that the acts of
terror kept happening due to lack of coordination
among government agencies responsible for na-
tional security. Tempo also wanted to show its
readers, as part of public’s right to know, what
the Indonesian government had done in managing
the terror attacks.
These representations are evidence in
some of Tempo news features such as Setelah
nirwana terbakar [After Nirvana Burnt], (No.
34/XXXI/21-27 October 2002), Amrozi
Dicokok, Ba’asyir Tergeret? [Amrozi arrested,
Ba’asyir next?] (No. 37/XXXI/11 - 17 Novem-
ber 2002), Simpul ‘syahid’ sang imam [Imam’s
syahid knot] (No. 39/XXXI/25 November-1
December 2002) (the Bali bombing); Akhir
pelarian Hambali [End run of Hambali] (No. 25/
XXXII/18-24 August 2003), Mereka-reka otak
pelumat Marriott [Guessing the destroyer of
Marriott] (No. 24/XXXII/11-17 August 2003),
Mengendus bomber berlogat Melayu [Discov-
ering a Malay bomber] (No. 37/XXXII/10-16
November 2003) (the Marriott hotel bombing);
Doktor bom dari bilik-bilik gelap [A bombing
PhD from dark rooms] (No. 30/XXXIII/20-26
September 2004), Satu jejak bom Kuningan [A
clue of Kuningan bombing] (No. 31/XXXI/27
September-03 Oktober 2004) (the Australian
embassy bombing).
Of the three bombing events, Tempo gave
more coverage on the issue of the investigation
process conducted by the police in the 2002 Bali
bombing. It is because the 2002 Bali bombing was
the first bombing event that had killed many for-
eigners, especially Australians. Therefore, how the
security apparatus dealt with this issue would in-
vite international attention. The bombing also
marksthe shift of JI’s attack with its main objec-
tive to destroy western or related interests and to
establish khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic entity). Fur-
ther, this issue is interesting in relation to Tempo’s
attempt to portray the work of Indonesian police
after separation from the Indonesian army (TNI)
in 1999. News items describing the investigation
process read as follows:
After Nirvana Burnt
Who the perpetrators of Bali bombing are
remain dark. Officers face difficulty to in-
vestigate witnesses.
…The police still have no leads regarding the
bombing perpetrators. They have launched a
big operation called “Great Bali Operation”
with 30 days operational target. Around
5.515 Indonesian police personals involves in
the operation. Not to mention foreign intelli-
gent force helping the team. At this time, In-
donesia receives help from 11 American Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, 26
Australian Federal Police, two people from
German, and two people from Scotland Yard,
and some others from Japan, Swiss, Swedia,
and Finlandia…
...The scenario of who the perpetrators are
and what the motives behind the event remain
unclear. Speculations spread around the is-
sue. Western media, for instance, believes that
Legian bomb was the work of Al-Qaidah cells
in Indonesia. Minister of Defence Matori
Abdul Djalil also accused Usamah bin Ladin
network was behind the bombing. “It is based
on the intelligence information that I have re-
ceived,” he said. On the contrary, radical Is-
lamists believed that the tragedy was only the
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work of Western intelligence to destroy the
image of Islam. The police had made some
possibilities: from act of Islamic radical move-
ment to drug syndicate war. None can be
proven though… (No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Oc-
tober 2002).
         Amrozi arrested, Ba’asyir next?
The police believe Amrozi is the Bali bomb-
ing perpetrator. But his relation with
Ba’asyir and international terror movement
still need to prove.
Amrozi is not an ordinary prisoner. Ac-
cording to the police, he is the main actor and one
of the Bali bombing perpetrators that killed 186
people and wounded more than 200 people. The
Police announced Amrozi as the suspect. He is
the suspect of act of terror that the world consid-
ered as the most devastating event after World
Trade Centre tragedy in New York, United States
of America, 11 September last year.
The fugitive had been caught. The police
looked happy. This was the first time the police
was able to capture a person in the case of Bali
bom-bing and was immediately labelled as sus-
pect. Before, the police was unsure with the in-
volvement of those arrested. Mainly they were
Temporarily under investigation, but eventually re-
leased and was labelled “possible suspect”…
From the suspect’s house, the police found
some evident. Among them were a plastic bag of
brown hung, a plastic bag of white crystal, a plas-
tic bag of white powder, a passport, a photo al-
bum, and a white Toyota Crown car with a license
plate number G 8488 B. Further, the police also
confiscated five tires and a car seat of L-300, a
mini bus to be used to carry the explosive materi-
als that destroyed Legian area…
After his second marriage failed, he went
to Malaysia and became a coolie there. The po-
lice accused Amrozi, during his stay in the neigh-
bouring state, to have built relation with radical
Islamists that is now called as Jemaah Islamiyah.
“He also has travelled around Singapore and Thai-
land,” said a police officer. During the investiga-
tion, the police said that Amrozi knew Hambali
and Imam Samudra-two suspects behind Christ-
mas bombing two years ago. Amrozi even said
that Bali bombing was directly led by Imam (No.
37/XXXI/11 - 17 November 2002).
Tracing Malay bombers
Dr. Azahari and Noordin M. Top’s tracks
were hardly traced. Their cellular phone
signals could not be located. What were
their friends’ confessions?
A police official kept looking at his note-
book on the table. On the screen, there were two
faces of main suspects that must be captured ei-
ther dead or alive: Azahari bin Husain, a man with
thick glasses, and Noordin Mohammad Top. This
official with civilian cloth never felt bored staring
at the two Malaysians who were accused for mas-
terminding the bombings in Bali last year and JW
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, early in August this year.
Sitting at a hotel lobby, we could see a small gun
hiding in his leg.
These hunters kept tracing their main sus-
pects from villages in Lembang, North Bandung,
up to the hill area in Gunung Batu, which was dif-
ficult to walk through. It was because the Chief of
West Java Police Headquarter, Inspector General
Dadang Garnida, said that the two terrorists were
possibly still in West Java province. It was in this
area that the cellular phones’ signals of Dr Azahari,
age 45, and Noordin, age 33, were last detected
before they escaped from the police ambush, in a
house on Kebon Kembang street, Tamansari,
Bandung, on Thursday two weeks ago…Chief of
Indonesian police, General Da’i Bachtiar, had an-
other analysis. According to the former Chief of
East Java Police Headquarter, it was possible that
both Azahari and Noordin aka Isa were now in
the area with the same culture. Moreover these
two neighbouring citizens could not leave their
Malay accent.
The analysis from the top person in the In-
donesian Police force was based on some argu-
ments. In Sumatra, Azahari successfully deceived
the police and was disguised for nearly eight
months. The mastermind of the bombings on
Legian street, Kuta, Bali and closed to the Ameri-
can Consulate in Renon, Denpasar on 12 Octo-
ber 2002 was traced by the police after a mem-
ber of this terrorist group, Idris aka Gembrot, was
arrested in Medan, last July. It was from him that
the police received confirmed information: one of
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian
Mujahidin Group) leaders which were hunted by
the then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, kept
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changing places (No. 37/XXXII/10-16 Novem-
ber 2003).
In the first and third news feature above,
Tempo portrayed the difficulty the security appa-
ratus faced to uncover the mastermind behind the
bombings. The help that came from some foreign
intelligent indicates how the Indonesian govern-
ment was not ready to manage terrorism. In the
early 2000, Indonesian government denied the
existence of terrorism in Indonesia, moreover on
the accusation that there were radical Islamic
groups who had adopted method of violence to
establish khilafah Islamiyah (Islamic entity).
Tempo further portrayed how each party within
community and international world seemed to have
its own opinion on the issue. This portrayal repre-
sents how the bombing had created chaos within
community as well as government and raised ac-
cusation one another. Implicitly, Tempo wanted
to remain the security apparatus to seriously in-
vestigate and arrest the perpetrators in order to
give certain condition to public. The reporting of
all parties that commented on the issue also signi-
fies how Tempo attempted to accommodate their
opinions in the reporting.
Interestingly, in the second news feature,
Tempo described the success of police investiga-
tion team in arresting one of the suspected perpe-
trators of Bali bombing. It constructed the news
feature by chronologically reported the arresting
process and how the police finally came up with
the suspect name. This reporting was meant to in-
form public the progress the police had made fol-
lowing the bombing. Nevertheless, through its edi-
torial within the same edition as the news feature
published (No. 37/XXXI/11-17 November
2002), Tempo warned the police not to give mis-
leading information to public considering the ar-
rest of suspected perpetrators as follow:
When the arrest of Amrozi was first broad-
casted on television on last Wednesday dur-
ing daytime, head of public relations division
of East Java Police Headquarter denied the
news later in the afternoon...This denial was
confusing as the arrest information came from
the police news source.
Nonetheless, since last Thursday afternoon,
the arrest and the determination of suspect
status toward Amrozi were admitted by the
Chief of Indonesian Police, General Da’i
Bachtiar, exactly the same as reported the day
before...Some people suspected that this mis-
information-misleading explanation to create
certain effects-had been purposively launched
by the police. The goals of this technique were
never explained. This misinformaton, which
principally equals to simply lying, could bring
negative impacts to many parties, and could
be embarrassing when exposed.]
The representation of the investigation
process as shown through the news features above
represents the professional journalistic practice of
Tempo news magazine. Why? It is because within
the context of media-government relationship,
Tempo has long history with the government where
the news weekly magazine had ever been banned
twice. Nonetheless, Tempo had taken a legal way
to lodge the lawsuit against the government via
court. Apart from the fact that Tempo finally failed
to win the case, this issue indicates how Tempo-
as part of its vision to build society that put re-
spect on opinion difference-had professionally
taken the issue via court instead of rallied on the
street protesting the ban.
The same case can also be seen via news
features above. Tempo portrayed the police at-
tempt to investigate the bombing and the police
success to capture the perpetrators behind the
bomb. With the adoption of in-depth and investi-
gative news gathering technique and the implemen-
tation of news feature writing, Tempo was able to
detail the information both during the investigation
process as well as the capture process of the
bombing perpetrators. Considering its history with
the New Order government, Tempo could have
given small portion of reporting of the police suc-
cess in capturing the bombing perpetrators. This
is why Tempo has been regarded as one of the
most read news magazine (AC Nielsen 1999 and
2002) in Indonesia and has been the trusted news
sources to many of its readers. Thus, Tempo is
truly a news media institution that employs a pro-
fessional journalistic practice.
This issue of investigation process is also
crucial to report so that public and especially in-
ternational world knew to what extent the Indo-
nesian government seriously managed these acts
of terrorism and assured that this kind of event
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would not happen again in the future. Within Tem-
po’s perspective, the reporting of the investigation
process as well as the arresting of the perpetra-
tors of the bombing were part of public’s right to
know. In times of confusion, uncertainty and threat-
ened feeling, public requires reliable information.
Furthermore, the three bombing events occurred
within the dynamic social and political conditions
in the early reformation era where Indonesia was
still searching its new way to a democratic state.
That was why public needed information sources
that can be trusted and news media like Tempo
became one of them. As stated in its mission,
Tempo wants to be a news media that “is inde-
pendent, free from capital owner and political pres-
sures.”
 It is what the Pew Centre for Civic Jour-
nalism called as civic journalism, which is “a belief
that journalism has an obligation to public life-an
obligation that goes beyond just telling the news
or unloading lots of fact. The way we do our jour-
nalism affects the way public life goes. Journalism
can help empower a community or it can help dis-
able it” (Itule & Anderson, 2003, p.12). Tempo
had been able to demonstrate a professional im-
plementation of journalism rather than to be a sim-
ple publication.
In relation to the freedom of the press in
the era of ‘reform’, Tempo did not experience any
significant changes in its editorial policy which was
just like in the era of New Order repressive re-
gime. It was because it had adopted a liberal way
of reporting based on principles of fairness, check
and balance, independent, and accuracy since its
establishment. These principles were further ad-
justed with the social and political conditions within
the country. Nonetheless, it doesn’t mean that
Tempo did not face any challenges in this era of
‘reform’. As described in research VI, Tempo had
to deal with some challenges from particular
groups within society that principally against the
freedom of the press. Tempo’s consistent report-
ing had led this magazine to receive some acknowl-
edgements from some institutions such as Best
Cover from Asia Publishing Congress, Singapore
in 1986 and Medal of Honour from Missouri
School of Journalism, United States in 2004.
Tempo’s liberal and critical reporting to-
ward government, for instance, can be seen in the
news feature Ketika nirvana terbakar [After nir-
vana burnt] as follows,
 After Nirvana Burnt
Who the perpetrators of Bali bombing are
remains dark. Officers face difficulty to in-
vestigate witnesses.
…Instead of solving the case, military and
police quarreled against each other. A police
from the Bali Police headquarter admitted that
he did not get good result when investigating
a witness from the military. “There is a pres-
sure from military officials not to prolong the
investigation on them”, said the source. On
the other hand, military police commander of
Bali region, Colonel Pranoto, denied the fact.
However, he said, “What the use to investi-
gate if it only worsens the condition? Moreo-
ver all investigation must first obtain permis-
sion from the commander. All must go through
me.” He in turn insulted the police for work-
ing slowly and carelessly. “They have no sense
of crisis,” he said…(No. 34/XXXI/21-27
Oktober 2002).
This paragraph was placed at the end of
the news feature that became the main story in the
edition a week after the 2002 Bali bombing.
Through this representation, Tempo criticised the
conflict that occurred between the police and the
military which may hamper the investigation proc-
ess. Tempo had deep concern that the separation
and bigger role of the police from the military may
create obstacles, just as in the investigation proc-
ess of the bombing. Since the separation in 1999,
the police have been given the responsibility for
internal security, whereas external defence remains
the domain of the military. Unfortunately, the divi-
sion process was not followed with the enhance-
ment of the police capacity which was shown by
the slow response to the terrorism attack. The
military, on the other hand, considered that coun-
ter-terrorism and intelligence should have been
part of its role. This “grey area” has resulted in the
increasing gap between the military and the police
(see ICG No.90/2004). Tempo implicitly por-
trayed this issue through the above paragraph. It
can conclude that as part of its role as the fourth
estate, Tempo played its social control function
toward the state by criticizing the conflict that oc-
curred between the police and the military.
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Another important issue that Tempo criti-
cally portrayed and can be categorised in the in-
vestigation process was how officials or ministers
within governmental structure had accused one
another to be responsible for what happened in
Bali. News feature exhibiting this issue appeared
as follows,
  Accusing one another in managing Legian
Hundreds of people died in Legian, Cabi-
net members quarrelled. Why did the gov-
ernment seem slow in handling the case?
…In a cabinet meeting the following day, the
issue of how to manage the tragedy was nearly
not included in the agenda. In a meeting at the
Presidential Palace attended by all cabinet
members, a quarrel occurred between Vice
President Hamzah Haz and some ministers
whom he accused did not do anything in man-
aging the case.
Whilst showing a news research, Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono said he felt offended
with what Hamzah Haz had said. “Frankly,
we are offended with Vice President’s state-
ment who said that we were only NATO (no
action, talk only). We had worked hard, but
why we were embarrassed such a way out-
side,” Susilo protested.
It was his fellow worker in politic and secu-
rity, head of the State Intelligence Agency,
A.M. Hendropriyono, gave his comment. He
also criticized Hamzah Haz’s statement in the
newsresearchs. According to Hendro, a vice
president should have not issued such a state-
ment.
Mega (President) who led the meeting re-
mained silent. She did not do anything to neu-
tralize the tension. That was why the tension
raised when Hamzah replied the two retired
generals. This quarrel was nearly unstoppable
if Minister Jusuf Kalla did not talk to Susilonot
to be provoked by Hamzah’s answer.
Consequently, the meeting meant to find the
solution on how to handle the bombing last
for five hours. It finished at three o’clock in
the afternoon. Fortunately, the meeting agreed
that government would implement government
regulation as the replacement of act on
antiterrorism... (No. 34/XXXI/21-27 Octo-
ber 2002).
Through this news feature Tempo explic-
itly criticized Megawati’s government incompe-
tency in handling the act of terror. It is signified by
the quarrel between the vice president, who be-
fore the bombing strictly against the possibility of
the existence of terrorists from radical Islamic group
in Indonesia, and minister of defence and head of
state intelligence agency. After the bombing oc-
curred, he accused that security apparatus-intelli-
gence and the police-were responsible for what
had happened in Bali.
The news feature above again proved the
high quality of Tempo in depth reporting where its
journalists could obtain information and chronol-
ogy of the cabinet meeting. And, as one of Tem-
po’s editorial board said,
With its weekly news magazine format has
made it possible for Tempo journalists to
spend days, weeks, and even perhaps months,
researching a compelling topic and then writ-
ing in depth. You could hardly see Tempo jour-
nalists attended a press conference. We will
meet the source after or before the press con-
ference to obtain different perspective as well
as information presented in the press confer-
ence (name to be anonymous, interview held
in Jakarta, 2006).
The portrayal of the issue above was to
give Tempo’s readers a description of how
Megawati’s government was not ready in dealing
with terrorism. This was proven with the issuance
of government regulation as the replacement of act
on antiterrorism, after the terrorist bomb exploded
in Legian which claimed hundreds of life, which
some of them were foreigners; whereas since the
year 2000, several bombings had occurred in In-
donesia, but no action was taken seriously to pre-
vent terrorists from continuously launched their acts
of terror in Indonesia. The slow response of
Megawati’s government toward terrorism events
had politically affected her image in the 2004 gen-
eral election. Tempo even made polling at the end
of 2002 regarding government performance in
dealing with terrorism, and the result was no
shocking where 70.14 percent of respondents felt
threatened with act of terrorism.
It then can be concluded that Tempo had
fairly reported the investigation process where it
reported not only the obstacles the police had to
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face in finding the bombing perpetrators, but also
the success of the police in arresting suspected
perpetrators. Nonetheless, as part of its role as
the fourth estate, Tempo also criticized the gov-
ernment for not seriously managing the terror
events and tended to be reactive instead of
proactive. The next issue discusses the final issue
that became Tempo’s main focus attention of the
portrayal of bombing events in Indonesia.
The Disclosure of Terrorist Network
The third issue related to Tempo’s repre-
sentation of recent terrorist events was the disclo-
sure of terrorist network in Indonesia. Although
placed as the third issue in this study, this issue can
be considered to have received Tempo’s exten-
sive reportage. It can be seen from not least than
ten editions and more than a hundred news fea-
tures of Tempo news magazine, ranging from 2002
to 2004 bombing events. Some arguments can be
proposed from the representation of this issue in
Tempo news magazine. First, as the most popu-
lous Muslim country in the world, Indonesia had
been accused as the terrorist haven. Secondly,
some radical groups had used Islamic values to
justify their acts of terror thorugh the adoption of
method of violence to reach their goals. As the
consequence, Islam had been associated with re-
ligion that legitimised violence.
As the media that claimed to be the repre-
sentation of society, Tempo felt it was its obliga-
tion to report the news that was written fairly and
balance. Through the representation of this issue,
Tempo attempted to show to its readers the ter-
rorist network that had been related with Osama
bin Laden’s al-Qaeda. Further, it attempted to give
the background as well as to end the debate that
rapidly grew within community concerning Islam,
radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia.
Of the three bombing events, Tempo gave
more coverage of the terrorist network post 2002
Bali bombing. Why? It is because Bali bombing
was the first terrorist attack, according to some
analysts, related to western interest; also, the ac-
cusation from international world that the attack
had been launched by radical Islamists. Therefore,
Tempo employed indepth and investigative report-
ing to disclose the terrorist network. The investi-
gative reporting had involved tens of Tempo jour-
nalists and correspondents from some places in
Indonesia as well as in other countries such as
Thailand and the United States. Some news fea-
tures relate to this issue include Jejak Ba’asyir di
Sungai Manggis [Ba’asyir’s trace in Manggis
river], Perjalanan seorang Ngruki dua [Jour-
ney of the second Ngruki] (No. 35/XXXI/28
October-3 November 2002), Balada sang
pendakwah di Negeri Sembilan [Balad of the
preacher in Negeri Sembilan] (No. 36/XXXI/4-
10 November 2002), Al-Islam yang mendadak
tenar [Al-Islam’s sudden famous] (No. 37/XXXI/
11-17 November 2002), Simpul ‘syahid’ sang
Imam [Imam’s syahid knot] (No. 39/XXXI/25
November-1 December 2002), Jihad Al-
Mukmin sampai ke kantin (No. 40/XXXI/02-
08 December 2002) (the Bali bombing);
Desainer bom yang paling dicari [Most wanted
bomb designer] (No. 26/XXXI/25-31 August
2003), Upaya menjerat Dr. Azahari (No. 27/
XXXI/25-31 August 2003) (the JW Marriott
Hotel bombing); Doktor bom dari bilik-bilik
gelap [Bomb doctor from dark rooms] (No. 30/
XXXII/20-26 September 2004). The emphasis
on the disclosure of terrorist network was evident
in Tempo news features as follows:
Journey of the second Ngruki
Ngruki was a homeland to Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir. From that place, he started his
life as a hard line Islamic preacher.
..The establishment of Al-Mukmin Islamic
School (pesantren) derived from 30 minute
noon prayer lectures at the Surakarta Great
Mosque. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah
Sungkar usually preached in turn…
Since then, the Islamic school developed rap-
idly. At the moment, the school had approxi-
mately 2,000 students from all over Indone-
sia. As the founder, Ba’asyir wrote a book
that became the guidance in the school. The
title was Tarbiyah Islamiyah and was used by
year seven students. In the school, the stu-
dents were taught the understanding of the
necessity to uphold Syari’ah Islam (Islamic
law) as the rule of life. “Upholding syari’ah
Islam widely is impossible to do without
power. Studying akidah (at Al-Mukmin)
means understand the essential of political Is-
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lam” said Muhammad Nursalim, a researcher
of IAIN Yogyakarta who wrote a thesis about
Al-Mukmin.
...Suspicion toward Sungkar and Ba’asyir
came to its peak after the 1977 general elec-
tion. At that time, Golkar won and the gov-
ernment was increasingly aware of radical Is-
lamic movement. Sungkar and Ba’asyir were
suspected to intentionally establish Indonesia
Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia or
NII). It was said that Ba’asyir had joined Haji
Ismail Pranoto, the leader of NII in Central
Java. The issue, however, was denied by
Ba’asyir…(No. 35/XXXI/28 October-3 No-
vember 2002).
Imam’s syahid knot
It was no mistake when Abdul Aziz chose his
alias as Imam Samudra. His calmness was as
wide as an ocean. When shown to journalists
last Friday, one day after arrested by the po-
lice, he appeared calmly. Wearing black t-shirt
with a brand of a sport product from America,
the country he hated, his gaze wipe around
tens of people’s eyes and cameras that stared
at him…
The ‘calm’ appearance of Abdul Aziz alias
Imam Samudra alias Kudama and other alias
had invited controversial stories. “He con-
fessed to have planned the Bali bombing,” said
Chief of Indonesian Police, General Da’i
Bachtiar. Public could soon believe that Imam
with a ‘cool’ face was a cruel terrorist; unlike
when the police captured Amrozi, the play-
boy from Tenggulun, Lamongan, East Java…
Imam admitted that he learned jihad and mili-
tary skill in Afghanistan for two and half years.
He learned how to use M-16 and AK-47
weapons and how to set mines. He went to
Afghanistan after finishing his study at
Madrasah Aliyah Negeri (equals to senior high
school) in Serang, Banten...
Imam really had a full confident. He believed
that he was untouchable. He even took his
wife and children in the terrorist operation that
he called  as jihad. The risk of death was put
aside for the sake of syahid with heaven as
the repayment. That was what Iqbal had done,
his friend who carried suicide bomb that de-
stroyed Paddy’s Café. “It was the real peak
of syahid,” said Abdul Aziz to the police of-
ficer who interrogated him (No. 39/XXXI/25
Nov-01 Des 2002).
Bomb ghost from Johor
Nobody could understand why Azahari bin
Husin could turn into the most frightening
bomb ghost in Southeast Asia. It was because
since he was young, very little clues led to the
radicalism of this math genius. It was suspected
that the cause must have left deeply in the life
of the 46 years old professor, so that he de-
cided to join in a militant Islamic group and
travelled across Afghanistan and Philippines.
Azahari went to Australia for four years in the
end of 1970s, when most of Malaysian stu-
dents preferred to study political Islam as the
impact of Islamic revolution in Iran. However,
none of radical or religious groups had invited
Azahari’s interest. “He never joint the groups”
said a Malaysian police officer.
After returned to Malaysia, Azahari and his
wife taught at the Malaysia University of Tech-
nology in Skudai, Johor…At that time he even
hadn’t shown strong Islamic sentiment.
Malaysian intelligence suspected that the
change occurred in mid 1990s when he often
attended the recitation of the Quran held by
the late Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir.
…First, the police thought that the sick of his
wife after birth giving his second child would
be the catalyst of change within Azahari. What
happened was the other way around. He went
to Afghanistan and southern Philippines at the
end of 1990s. “It was since in the Philippines
that he became obsessed with bomb making”
said a Malaysian security official.
“He was like a re-born Muslim” said a Malay-
sian police source. It was quite different from
other followers of Jemaah Islamiyah network
who mostly came from villages and obtained
their Islamic teaching trough Islamic boarding
school (No. 27/XXXII/01-07 September
2003).
The three news features above principally
discuss two significant issues in relation to the dis-
closure of the terrorist network: pesantren (Is-
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lamic boarding school) and suspected bombing
perpetrators. Why are these two issues? It is be-
cause some Islamic boarding schools had been
accused for teaching radical and narrow under-
standing of Islamic values and the perpetrators of
acts of terror were pesantren graduates. Shuja (in
TerrorismMonitor 2005), in his report, identified
five pesantren (Islamic boarding school) include
al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Sukohardjo in Solo, al-
Muttaquien in Jepara (Central Java), Dar us-
Syahadah in Boyolali (Central Java) and al-Islam
in Lamongan (East Java). He claimed that alumni
network of pesantren graduates were important
element within the terrorist structure. The recorded
confessions of perpetrators of Bali II suicide bom-
bings in October 2005 indicate how young men
of pesantren, with their narrow understanding of
the meaning of jihad, believed that what they did
was to wage jihad and that they would go straight
to heaven after death.
All these accusation, added with the cov-
erage of western news media that had associated
Islam with violence, had created uncertainty within
community, even government. Nevertheless, it
can’t be denied that there were particular groups
who had adopted and misused Islamic teachings
for their political ends. Thus, as part of its role to
inform public of the real condition following the
bombing events and to reduce uncertainty, Tempo
felt it was necessary to report the issue.
The three news features explicitly highlight
pesantren Al-Mumin in Ngruki, Solo, Central Java
led by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir; Imam  Samudra who
had been accused to have planned the Bali bomb-
ing attack; and Azahari who expert in making
bomb. By placing all the news features above as
main cover stories for several editions, Tempo had
been attempting to uncover the terrorist network.
Nonetheless, Tempo carefully named the group
who launched the attack as Jemaah Islamiyah.
Even four months after the 2002 Bali bombing, in
its end year edition, Tempo still did not dare to
use the name Jemaah Islamiyah, but uncover how
the name had come to surface.
In the case of first news feature (Journey
of the second Ngruki); Tempo portrayed the in-
ternal condition of Al-Mukmin Islamic Boarding
School (pesantren) established by the late Abdullah
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Tempo brought
this issue to surface because both founders and
the school were believed to have taught radical
understanding of Islam to its students. Furthermore,
some perpetrators of act of terror were Al-
Mukmin graduates. This condition had created an
opinion as if this pesantren had produced terrorist
graduates. Therefore, Tempo reported this issue
as part of its role to fulfil public’s right to know
and to reduce uncertainty and anxiety within com-
munity. Nevertheless, Tempo tried to be neutral in
its reporting. Consequently, the meaning of the
news feature can be comprehended as follow:
It is true that Ba’asyir had implemented
hard discipline at the Al-Mukmin Islamic Board-
ing School in Ngruki, Solo. The students were
taught the necessity of understanding Islamic law
as the way of life, but none of the teaching mate-
rial related to terrorism. The late Abdullah Sungkar
and Ba’asyir’s preach, since the early establish-
ment of the school, tended to criticise government
who they considered as secular government. This
had made the New Order government, at that time,
classified both to have involved in the establish-
ment of Indonesian Islamic State (NII). Implicitly,
however, Tempo did not find any direct link be-
tween the school and the so called Jemaah
Islmaiyah.
Within Tempo perspective, this represen-
tation was necessary to avoid misjudgement and
generalisation of pesantren to be the place for
Muslim radicalisation. Also, to report the case of
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir based on the principle of fair
and balance, without having to get involved in the
issue.
The second and third news features por-
trayed the profiles of Imam Samudra and Dr.
Azahari. Imam Samudra was, based on his claim,
the planner of the 2002 Bali bombing and Dr. Azahri
was expertise in bomb making. The reporting of
the profiles of these suspects was evidence of Tem-
po’s attempt to disclosure the terrorist network.
The news features were constructed through in
depth reporting style that involved investigation
process conducted by the reporter.
The representation of the second and third
news features signify the fact that terrorists existed
and lived among society. The reporting of Imam
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Samudra’s profile, for instance, was published af-
ter the police was able to arrest the man based on
the confession of Amrozi, the first Bali bombing
suspects that had already been arrested. This rep-
resentation was mean to inform public that there
were groups within society who had misused Is-
lamic values (such as jihad) and had adopted
method of violence to justify their acts of terror.
Samudra’s calm and confident appearance in front
of journalists, but confessed to be the planner of
the Bali bombing shocked public who since the
bombing were under uncertainty as there had been
growing debate whether there were radical groups
in Indonesia.
The similar understanding can also be em-
ployed to the third news feature portraying Dr.
Azahari. The reporting of this bomb expert who
originally came from Malaysia may have become
a proof that there was a terrorist network that span
along some Southeast Asian countries (see ICG
No.63/2004). Therefore, the government of these
countries need to work together in combating ter-
rorism.
Implicitly, Tempo gave its complement to
the police for being able to arrest those who were
suspected to be the perpetrators of acts of terror,
but at the same time warned that terrorism would
always be a threat to the national security, existing
government as well as society. The warning could
be analysed from the reporting of the dangerousof
Azahari as a bomb expert-before finally shoot to
dead in early November 2005-and Samudra’s
statement in the last paragraph who said that sui-
cide bombing was the true peak of jihad.
In general, textual analysis yields some in-
teresting findings in relation to the Tempo’s repre-
sentation of the disclosure of the terrorist network
was meant to inform public that terrorists existed
and lived among society and had become an im-
minent threat to Indonesia’s national security that
had just entered the era of ‘reform’. The detailed
description of al-Mukmin Islamic boarding school
and two suspected terrorists was to provide Tem-
po’s readers with information needed to make
judgement under uncertainty condition. It was
able to play its role as the story teller and stayed
independent in the issue. With the form as a news
magazine that is published weekly, Tempo had
adopted in-depth reporting and written the news
in the form of feature to give different way of news
reporting.
Conclusion
Tempo’s libertarian and critical reporting
style has made it a leading news magazine in In-
donesia. Its past history with the New Order gov-
ernment-Tempo was banned twice-indicates how
the news magazine would report the news con-
sidered important to public, regardless of the con-
sequences. In relation to the representation of ter-
rorism, Tempo principally adopted fair, check and
balanced, cover both sides’ principles. Actuality,
indepth and accuracy in reporting represent Tem-
po’s strong and independent editorial policy.
The representations of three bombing
events in Tempo’s news magazine had been con-
structed through cultural and political perspectives.
These can be analysed from the representation of
the investigation process conducted by the police,
and the disclosure of the terrorist network. Princi-
pally, the selection of issue of investigation proc-
ess was to inform the public of the progress the
police had done regarding the acts of terror. This
was meant to create comfort and safe feelings
within society. It was clear that uncertainty condi-
tion arouse following the bombings. Politically, it
had to admit that the way Megawati’s government
handled the 2002 Bali bombing had contributed
to the decrease of her reputation in the 2004 gen-
eral election. This was signified by the quarrel be-
tween vice president and minister of defence.
In the last representation, Tempo carefully
reported the suspected terrorist network, Jemaah
Islamiyah. Nonetheless, Tempo carefully used the
term. It was meant to avoid a judgement as if Is-
lam-as the dominant religion embraced by Indo-
nesian society-identical with terrorism activities.
Tempo attempted to inform as well as to educate
public that there were groups within society that
had misused Islamic values for their acts of terror.
In sum, Tempo’s representation of terror-
ism had been delivered through a professional
practice of journalism. It played the role as the
story teller and stayed neutral from the conflict. At
the same time, it can be said that Tempo had played
its role as the fourth estate with its critical report-
ing toward the way the government managed the
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issue. Thus, Tempo’s vision to be ‘the guidance in
the process of enhancing people’s freedom of
thought and expression and to build society that
appreciates smartness and difference of opinion’
was realised through the publication of reliable
news media.
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